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Abstract Online labor markets provide new opportunities for behavioral research,
but conducting economic experiments online raises important methodological
challenges. This particularly holds for interactive designs. In this paper, we provide
a methodological discussion of the similarities and differences between interactive
experiments conducted in the laboratory and online. To this end, we conduct a
repeated public goods experiment with and without punishment using samples from
the laboratory and the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk. We chose to
replicate this experiment because it is long and logistically complex. It therefore
provides a good case study for discussing the methodological and practical chal-
lenges of online interactive experimentation. We find that basic behavioral patterns
of cooperation and punishment in the laboratory are replicable online. The most
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important challenge of online interactive experiments is participant dropout. We
discuss measures for reducing dropout and show that, for our case study, dropouts
are exogenous to the experiment. We conclude that data quality for interactive
experiments via the Internet is adequate and reliable, making online interactive
experimentation a potentially valuable complement to laboratory studies.
Keywords Experimental methodology ! Behavioral research ! Internet
experiments ! Amazon Mechanical Turk ! Public goods game ! Punishment
JEL Classification C71 ! C88 ! C90 ! D71
1 Introduction
Online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) are increasingly
popular tools for behavioral scientists. With their large and diverse pools of people
ready to promptly perform tasks for pay, these markets present researchers with new
opportunities to recruit participants for experiments.1 Studies from across the social
sciences have systematically compared data collected online with data from the
physical laboratory. Their conclusions are promising: classic results from psychol-
ogy and economics have been replicated using online samples, and the data obtained
online is deemed as reliable as that obtained via traditional methods.2
Despite its great potential, behavioral research online has so far remained largely
limited to non-interactive decision-making tasks or one-shot games with simulta-
neous decisions. Current online studies of social behavior often use survey software
such as Qualtrics or SurveyMonkey to document decision making in tasks that
participants complete individually, and emulate interactions through post hoc
matching. Although this approach can be powerful, it does not permit the study of
repeated, ‘hot’ interactions where live feedback between participants is essential.
Experimental designs with live interaction are rarely implemented online, partly
1 MTurk is by no means the only online labor market used for behavioral research. Peer et al. (2017)
identified six other platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research, in addition to platforms such as
Prolific Academic. See Buhrmester et al. (2011), Horton et al. (2011), Rand (2012), and Paolacci and
Chandler (2014) for evaluations of the potential of MTurk for conducting behavioral experiments in
psychology and other social sciences.
2 For example, Chesney et al. (2009) conduct classic experiments in a virtual world platform and observe
behaviour similar to the laboratory. Hergueux and Jacquemet (2015) find that social preferences of
student participants elicited online and offline are qualitatively very similar; see their Table 1 for further
references. Schmelz and Ziegelmeyer (2015) compare the behaviour of student participants in a principal-
agent experiment conducted in the laboratory and on the Internet and conclude that data can be of similar
quality. On MTurk, Horton et al. (2011) replicate classic framing effects and report similar levels of
cooperation in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma played online and in the laboratory. Berinsky et al. (2012)
replicate classic findings on framing and risk tasks. For overviews of replication studies, see Paolacci
et al. (2010), Behrend et al. (2011), Klein et al. (2014), and Mullinix et al. (2015).
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Table 1 Methodological differences in conducting interactive experiments in the laboratory and on
MTurk
Phase/challenge Laboratory Online (MTurk)
Recruitment
Show-up fees Typically a small part of total payoffs.
Guaranteed when participant shows up
to the session
Relatively large show-up fees promote
recruitment rates, thereby facilitating
prompt group formation. Experimenter
can approve or reject the task
submitted; if rejected no fee is paid
Inviting
participants
Invitations sent well in advance,
participants commit to a session.
Recruitment often from a pre-existing
database
Sessions advertised online as HITs and
can be completed immediately
Selection into
the
experiment
At sign-up, participants know very little
about the experiment. Details of the task
are communicated once participants are
in the laboratory
Experiments are typically advertised as
HITs with a brief task description.
‘Workers’ browse available HITs and
accept those of their preference
Experienced
participants
Invitation conditioned on well-defined
criteria of the laboratory’s records
HITs targeted at subsets of MTurk
workers; experimenter can specify
exclusion criteria. Many MTurk
workers will have participated in many
prior studies
Session start-up
Duplicate
participants
Registration protocols usually prevent
duplicate participation
Amazon acts against multiple worker
accounts, but they exist
Comprehension Participants can ask questions;
comprehension questions ensure
understanding
Experimenter is physically absent and
cannot answer questions directly.
Compulsory comprehension questions
can be added but may make experiment
(too) long for some participants
Experimental interactions
Forming groups Easy to guess how many participants will
attend; group settings can be pre-
defined
Hard to guess how many participants will
attend; groups can be constructed ‘on
the fly’
Deception In experimental economics deception is
prohibited and laboratories foster
reputations for non-deception
Because all requesters use the same
subject pool, some participants may
have experienced deception because
requesters from other disciplines may
use it
Communication Hardly an issue; experimenter can restrict
communication between subjects
Participants may in principle collude
through external channels though this is
difficult in practice
Experimental
flow
Closed form software like z-Tree specifies
session progress
Scripted browser navigation specifies
progress
Attrition
(‘dropout’)
Hardly an issue; participants that start a
session usually finish it
Major challenge to internal validity, if
dropout rates vary with treatment,
selection bias may arise
Payment
Payments Cash usually paid upon completion Automatic transfer through Amazon
Cost per
participant
Relatively high but predictable Relatively low but varies with attrition
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because there is not yet a widely-used web-based equivalent of z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007).3
In this paper, we assess the potential for interactive online experiments, where a
set of participants interacts for more than one repetition. Interactive experiments
raise novel challenges throughout the whole life cycle of an experiment. Our
approach is to discuss these challenges, that is, methodological differences and
similarities between interactive experiments in physical and online laboratories. We
discuss these step-by-step, from recruitment to dismissal of participants after the
experiment.
A particularly important challenge of interactive online experiments relates to
participant dropout. While in the physical laboratory participants rarely leave a
session, online experiments are more prone to dropouts which affect both the
participant who is dropping out and their interaction partners (who still have to be
paid for their participation). If dropouts happen for reasons exogenous to the
experiment—e.g. due to network problems, frozen screens, or random distrac-
tions—they are just a (costly) nuisance to the experimentalist. Much more
problematic are dropouts that happen endogenously, that is, people quitting because
of what has happened in the experiment. Such dropouts could jeopardize the internal
validity of experiments (Zhou and Fishbach 2016).
As a case study we replicate a repeated public goods game with and without peer
punishment used in cross-cultural research (Herrmann et al. 2008), employing a
sample of US participants recruited via MTurk.4 We chose to replicate this
experiment because it is fairly long and logistically complex. It is a within-subjects
design with two experimental conditions of ten periods each, where, after the first
set of ten periods, participants receive new instructions. Moreover, this experiment
has often been replicated, and its design allows us to evaluate whether dropouts
depend on the experimental conditions (that is, the presence or absence of
punishment). We report data from participants recruited via MTurk (62 groups) and
participants from the physical laboratory (18 groups). We used our own software
LIONESS (Sect. 2.5), developed for conducting interactive online experiments.
We observe that basic patterns of behavior online are similar to those in the
laboratory. In the absence of punishment, aggregate levels of cooperation are higher
on MTurk than in the laboratory, but show similar rates of decay over time.
Moreover, our econometric analysis reveals that in both of our samples the group
contributions strongly determine the level of cooperation. The introduction of
punishment promotes the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in both
samples. Punishment is mainly prosocial in nature in both samples (cooperators
punish non-cooperators) but occurs less frequently online.
3 Thus far interactive research developed its own bespoke software (see Egas and Riedl 2008; Suri and
Watts 2011; Wang et al. 2012; Gallo and Yan 2015; Nishi et al. 2015; Schmelz and Ziegelmeyer 2015;
Stagnaro et al. 2017), but recent software is likely to change this trend (see BreadBoard, MobLab, oTree,
SoPHIE, and UbiquityLab).
4 In one of the first studies using economic games on MTurk, Suri and Watts (2011) replicate the
laboratory results found by Fehr and Gachter (2000) using a repeated public goods game without
punishment.
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Our most important result is that, in our implementation, dropouts are most likely
due to reasons that are exogenous to the experiment. Together with the replication
of findings from the laboratory, our results suggest that online interactive
experiments can be a reliable tool for collecting internally-valid data and hence
are a potentially valuable complement to the physical laboratory.
Our paper contributes to a recently-emerged literature on the reliability of data
gathered on online labor markets such as MTurk (see references in footnotes 1–3).
The most important predecessor of our paper is Anderhub et al. (2001), who
compared online and laboratory experiments in the very early days of experimen-
tation on the Internet. They also provide a methodological discussion that, however,
could not consider the specific properties of modern online labor markets where the
bulk of present-day online experimentation is happening.5
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the
experimental design. In Sect. 3, we discuss the conceptual and logistical differences
between conducting interactive experiments in the laboratory and online and lay out
our approach for dealing with them, highlighting important aspects of the data-
collection process relating to attention and attrition. Section 4 shows the results of
our experiment, systematically comparing cooperation and punishment behavior in
our two samples. In Sect. 5 we present a detailed analysis of attrition in our online
experiment. Finally, in Sect. 6 we make concluding remarks.
2 A case study to compare online and laboratory experiments
We base our discussion of online and laboratory experiments on a well-established
paradigm: a public goods game with and without punishment (Fehr and Ga¨chter
2000, 2002). In this section, we present the design of our experiments conducted in
the laboratory and replicated online with a sample of participants recruited via
MTurk. For the laboratory and the online samples, instructions and experimental
screens were identical (screenshots are presented in the Online Appendix A).
2.1 General setup
Our experiment follows the within-subject design of Herrmann et al. (2008) and
implements a repeated four-person public goods game with two conditions: one
without punishment followed by one with punishment. Groups were constant
throughout the experiment (‘partner matching’), and each condition ran for ten
periods. Participants were aware that there were two ‘parts’ to the session (which
corresponded to the conditions without and with punishment) but learned about the
details of the second part only after the first one had finished.
At the beginning of a session, participants read on-screen instructions for the first
experimental condition: the public goods game without punishment. Experimental
5 Another early paper on experimentation on the internet is Reips (2000). The author discusses the
advantages and disadvantages of conducting online experiments and also provides a methodological
discussion of how internet experiments can be used to validate laboratory data.
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instructions were shorter than those in Herrmann et al. (2008) (see Sect. 3 for
rationale). Participants could start the interaction phase only once they had
completed a set of comprehension questions.
2.2 Condition 1: a public goods game without peer punishment
In each period of the 10-period game, all four group members received an
endowment of 20 points and simultaneously decided how many of those points to
keep for themselves, and how many to contribute to a ‘group project’ (i.e. the public
good). After all members had made their decision, the sum of all contributions was
multiplied by 1.6 and distributed equally among all group members irrespective of
their contributions. This setup reflects a social dilemma: in each period overall
earnings are highest when each of the group members contributes all 20 of their
points to the public good, while individuals maximize their earnings by contributing
0 regardless of the contributions of the others. Once all contributions had been made
participants learned the result of that period. Apart from their own contribution and
earnings, they were informed of the average contribution in their group.
Subsequently, a separate screen showed the contributions of each of their fellow
group members.
2.3 Condition 2: a public goods game with peer punishment
Once the 10 periods of Condition 1 were over, participants received new on-screen
instructions about Condition 2. This condition also consisted of ten periods and was
completed in the same groups as Condition 1. Again, the periods started once all
group members had completed the comprehension questions. The decision situation
was like Condition 1, but we introduced one change: once participants learned the
contributions of each of their group members, they could assign up to 10 deduction
points to each of their peers. Each assigned deduction point resulted in a loss of 1
point for the participant assigning it, and a loss of 3 points for its target. At the end
of each period a separate screen informed participants of the total number of points
they assigned and received. In cases where a participant made a loss during a period,
only the costs of assigning deduction points would count towards the final earnings
(cf. Herrmann et al. 2008). Each session concluded with a questionnaire including
demographic items.
2.4 Online and laboratory sample
In all sessions, participants received instructions and made their decisions via web
browsers. The program was implemented in the experimental software LIONESS
(Sect. 2.5). Both online and in the laboratory, sessions took 28 min on average. This
is considerably shorter than the original study by Herrmann et al. (2008), but longer
than typical tasks on MTurk.
For our online sample, we recruited participants via MTurk, restricting their
geographical location to the USA (for comparability with our laboratory sample, see
below). Results are based on 24 sessions, with 248 participants in total (62 groups of
A. A. Arechar et al.
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four). The average age of participants in this sample was 31.5 years (s.d. 9.06), and
38.4% were female. Average earnings in our online sample were $6.69 (s.d. $1.03),
which were paid via MTurk.
The data from our laboratory sample were collected at universities in two
different cities in the USA (Harvard University, Boston MA; and Yale University,
New Haven CT) over 8 sessions, with 72 participants in total (18 groups).
Laboratory participants were invited through e-mails using the online recruitment
software SONA. The average age for participants in this sample was 25.2 years (s.d.
7.45) and 42.3% were female. Average earnings in our laboratory sample were
$20.02 (s.d. $1.65), paid in cash upon session completion. To conform to standards
of the respective laboratories and average expected wages on MTurk, we used an
exchange rate of $0.02 in the laboratory and $0.01 in our online sessions; show-up
fees were $10 and $1 in the laboratory and online, respectively.6
2.5 The software used to conduct interactive experiments: LIONESS
We conducted both the laboratory and online experiments with LIONESS (Live
Interactive Online Experimental Server Software). LIONESS provides a basic
architecture for conducting interactive experiments online. Its key features reflect
the solutions to the logistical challenges discussed in Sect. 3; dynamically grouping
participants to minimize waiting times, regulating interactions in groups, promoting
participants’ attention to the experiment and dealing with participants dropping out
of an experiment. The software developed for the experimental conditions reported
here can be downloaded at: http://lioness.nottingham.ac.uk.
3 Methodological differences in conducting interactive experiments
in the laboratory and online
3.1 The online laboratory MTurk
While our discussion of online experiments is based on an MTurk sample, many
issues also hold for other online platforms (cf. footnote 1). MTurk is a large online
labor market, which offers an active pool of over 500,000 workers. The MTurk
workforce completes over 40,000 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) every day
(www.mturk-tracker.com; Difallah et al. 2015; Ipeirotis 2010). MTurk ‘workers’
browse HITs that are published by ‘requesters’ who provide a brief description of
the task, its expected duration and the minimum payment workers will receive upon
completion (see Online Appendix A for screenshots of the HIT as published on
MTurk). HITs typically involve short individual assignments which computers are
currently unable to perform (Berinsky et al. 2012), such as the processing of images
6 Using four canonical one-shot games, Amir et al. (2012) find results comparable to those found in the
laboratory, even when using relatively low stakes. In the public goods context, Suri and Watts (2011) also
report similar levels of cooperation when using two different compensation levels.
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or data cleaning. Due to the sheer size of the pool of workers ready to perform tasks
for pay, MTurk enables researchers to conduct large-scale experiments and to
implement an effective random assignment of participants to different conditions
beyond the capacity of a typical physical laboratory.7 While not primarily designed
for academic research, MTurk has the potential for efficient data collection. As
mentioned in the introduction, questionnaire studies and experiments without rep-
etitions (e.g. one-shot Prisoner’s dilemma) conducted with MTurk participants have
produced results comparable to those obtained from laboratory samples (e.g. Pao-
lacci et al. 2010; Horton et al. 2011; Goodman et al. 2013).
Despite their promise, online behavioral experiments have conceptual and
logistical challenges that are usually not present in the laboratory. Here we focus on
differences between laboratory and online experimentation that are specific to
interactive designs. See Buhrmester et al. (2011) and Paolacci and Chandler (2014)
for extensive discussions of differences regarding non-interactive (survey-style)
designs.
3.2 A step-by-step comparison of laboratory and online experiments
We now discuss the implementation of interactive experiments in the laboratory and
online via MTurk, based on the design we presented above. Our discussion is
chronological in the way a typical experiment proceeds from recruitment to
dismissal of participants. The four following subsections discuss the main phases of
a typical experimental session (recruitment, session start-up, interactive decision
making and payment). Along the way, we highlight the extent to which our
approach bridges these gaps in the (relatively long and logistically-challenging)
experiment presented above. Table 1 provides a concise overview of the issues
discussed in this section.
3.2.1 Recruitment
In a typical laboratory experiment, participants receive a show-up fee for attending.
Still, the main part of the participant’s payment is usually determined by the
decisions made over the course of the session. In a typical task on MTurk,
participants are paid a flat reward per HIT, and the part of the earnings determined
by their decisions can be added to their payments as a ‘bonus’. Consequently, a HIT
that pays a relatively large flat fee usually draws more attention than one that
promises a large bonus. This is particularly relevant for interactive experiments
where participants need to wait for others to form a group at the start of a session
(see below).
Sessions in the laboratory are pre-scheduled. A database contains the contact
details of a pool of aspiring participants, who can register (and cancel) within a
determined time window. Pre-scheduling ensures that the number of participants
7 In comparison to the student or community samples normally used in the laboratory, MTurk samples
are also more diverse (Krupnikov and Levine 2014; Paolacci and Chandler 2014; Weinberg et al. 2014;
Berinsky et al. 2012).
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can be anticipated quite accurately before a session takes place, and including a
small number of backup participants can prevent problems associated with
unannounced non-attendance. Online platforms such as MTurk allow for instant
recruitment of participants, facilitating a time-efficient method of data collection.8
To take advantage of these opportunities, LIONESS was ready to accommodate
new participants during a time window specified by us, while capping the maximum
number of entrants. In our experiment, we invited participants to sign up within
20 min of the HIT being posted and allotted them 45 min to complete the task. In
addition, we asked them to start immediately. Recruitment rates were high (in a
typical session with 100 slots, the first 50 participants normally entered within the
first 5 min after the publication of the HIT), facilitating prompt group formation
once participants had read and understood the instructions.9
Invitations to laboratory experiments rarely reveal any information on the
contents of the experiment. On MTurk, however, participants browse various tasks
that are currently available to complete for pay. This requires a HIT description
giving the workers some idea of what the task will involve. To avoid self-selection
(based on the topic of the experiment) into interactive experiments as much as
possible, an experimenter can leave out any detailed information in the HIT
description.10 For example, we did not announce that these are public goods
experiments. On the other hand, it is essential that workers know that the HIT will
involve live interactions with other people, and therefore they are expected to
complete the interactive HIT without delay and without interruptions. The HIT
description within MTurk is an appropriate place to make participants aware of this
(see Online Appendix A for screenshots).
Typical laboratory subject pools are replenished annually when a new cohort of
first-year students arrives on campus, and recruitment software allows invitation of
only those participants with no (or little) experience with the experimental paradigm
of a study. By contrast, the pool of MTurk workers (MTurkers) is replenished more
regularly, but oftentimes MTurkers quickly acquire a sizable experience partici-
pating in hundreds of academic studies of all kinds.11 While researchers may have
reason to believe that (frequent) prior experience could be an issue for their
experiment (for a discussion of ‘‘lab rats’’ see Guillen and Veszteg 2012), MTurk
facilitates inviting participants based on various criteria (e.g. number of HITs
8 Also, the size of the potential pool of participants on MTurk allows researchers to use designs requiring
large groups, and to obtain sufficient statistical power to detect effects of relatively small size (e.g. Hauser
et al. 2016).
9 We chose a 20-min time slot based on pilot sessions. Over time, MTurk HITs move down the list of
most recently-published jobs and entrance rates tend to taper off. When participants trickle in at low rates,
the chances that they have to wait for a long time before they can be matched into a group increase
substantially.
10 Self-selection into experiments may not be a specific problem for online studies. Selection effects may
also occur in physical laboratories which regularly run interactive tasks. Participants may anticipate their
tasks involving interactions with other participants in their session due to previous experience or hearing
about it from other members of the subject pool; see Krawczyk (2011), Anderson et al. (2013), Cleave
et al. (2013) and Abeler and Nosenzo (2015) for detailed discussions.
11 Stewart et al. (2015) estimate a worker half-life of about seven months and Rand et al. (2014) report a
median of 300 academic studies, 20 of which occurred in the past week.
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completed, their success rate or their geographic location). In addition, post-
experimental questionnaires can include self-reported measures of participants’
familiarity with decision-making experiments and specific experimental paradigms.
In our case, we used MTurk’s options to restrict the geographical location of the
participants to the United States for comparability with our laboratory sample. In
addition, to increase the likelihood that participants completed our HIT with care,
we only allowed workers with at least 90% of their previous HITs approved by
requesters to participate (see Peer et al. 2014 for a detailed discussion of approval
rates).
3.2.2 Session start-up
For many studies, it is essential that participants take part only once. In the
laboratory it is relatively straightforward to implement this, particularly if the
experimenter uses recruitment software such as ORSEE (Greiner 2015), SONA or
hroot (Bock et al. 2014) and is physically present during laboratory sessions to
confirm identities. For online sessions, however, re-takers may seriously compro-
mise the data (e.g. by operating two browsers within the same experiment,
potentially even controlling two players within the same group). Accordingly
detecting them requires specific measures. Within a session, we prevented duplicate
participation by logging the user’s IP address and blocking users that had already
been connected to the experimental server. Between sessions, we used third-party
software to prevent workers who had already participated in a specific HIT from
being invited for future sessions.12
In a typical laboratory session participants can ask questions which the
experimenter can answer in private, before the interactive phase of the experiment
begins. For online sessions this is not feasible. To ensure that participants had a
thorough understanding of the experimental decision situation and did not rush
through the instructions, we introduced compulsory comprehension questions which
participants had to solve before entering the decision-making phase of the
experiment.13 A fraction of participants who entered the experimental pages did not
proceed past the instructions and never reached the comprehension questions. In our
online sample, 83.2% of the individuals who did reach the comprehension questions
solved them successfully.14
12 We used UniqueTurker (http://uniqueturker.myleott.com) to prevent re-takes between sessions. This
method uses a unique MTurk identification number which is linked to each worker and that Amazon
constantly monitors to avoid duplicate participation. Alternatives for these methods include Turkprime
(http://turkprime.com).
13 We used considerably shorter experimental instructions than Herrmann et al. (2008) to minimize the
variation in the time that participants take to read them; with dynamic group formation, minimal variation
in preparation time is highly desirable (e.g. to reduce attrition, see below).
14 When entering an incorrect answer, subjects were allowed to try again. Incidentally, the total number
of incorrect attempts in the six comprehension questions prior to Condition 1 did not differ between our
laboratory and online samples (4.68 vs 4.46, respectively, Mann–Whitney test: p = 0.245).
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3.2.3 Experimental interaction
In the laboratory, all participants typically arrive at a session at the same time and
will simultaneously complete comprehension questions. By contrast, participants in
online sessions may arrive during a time window set by the experimenter (20 min in
our case), and the timing of completing comprehension questions may therefore
vary substantially. Accordingly, we formed groups ‘on the fly’: participants who
successfully completed the comprehension questions waited in a ‘lobby’. As soon as
this lobby contained sufficient participants, a group was formed and its members
were sent to the interaction phase of the experiment. An alternative (yet
considerably less time-efficient) approach is to run pre-tests with participants and
to build a ‘standing panel’ from which candidates for experimental sessions are
recruited (see Suri and Watts 2011; Gallo and Yan 2015).
Although deception is uncommon in experimental economics, participants on
MTurk are likely to encounter studies using deception (e.g. Pfattheicher and
Schindler 2015). Participants may therefore be skeptical about the truthfulness of
experimental instructions and doubt if their interaction partners are real people and
not robots pre-programmed by the experimenter publishing the HIT. To promote
trust between us (as experimenters) and the participants, we continuously strive to
maintain a good reputation on our MTurk requester account (our records and those
of other requesters can be found at https://turkopticon.ucsd.edu). In addition, our
HIT description stated explicitly that groups were formed of real people recruited
from MTurk.
To keep the attention of the participants focused on the experiment (and not have
them dropping out in the very first period of the game), we clearly communicated
the number of other participants they were waiting for at any given moment, and we
added an on-screen countdown indicating the maximum amount of time left before
participants could choose to leave the experiment if no group could be formed.
When this timer reached zero in our experiment, participants could choose to either
return to the lobby and wait for two additional minutes or to leave the session and
collect their participation fee (of $1). This procedure led to a total of 89% of
participants who correctly completed the comprehension questions being success-
fully matched into a group and starting the interaction phase.15 The remaining 11%
could not be matched in a group of four, and were paid their participation fee.
While in the laboratory the experimenter can monitor and enforce any restriction
of communication between participants, it is in principle harder to categorically
exclude the possibility that online participants communicate with their interaction
partners through external channels. We ran relatively large sessions in which
participants could not be identified to prevent them from colluding via online
forums such as Reddit or MTurk Crowd. In fact, forum discussions, which are
15 As subjects completed the experiment in their browsers, we strictly regulated navigation between
experimental pages. Participants navigating the pages at will may lead to serious disruptions in the
experimental flow and even lead to crashing sessions. We used LIONESS to regulate the sequence of an
experiment in a browser by using a pop-up window without navigation bars and overwriting the browser
history within that window when moving on to another page. This procedure also prevented participants
from revising their decisions during a given interaction.
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usually moderated and prohibit the dissemination of the content of HITs and the
discussion of strategies, typically center upon the attractiveness of a HIT in terms of
earnings and length rather than its content (Chandler et al. 2014). Therefore,
communication between participants is a potential problem for online experiments,
but it is not any more severe for interactive designs. A similar argument could be
made for communication with other people who are not participating in the task at
hand (e.g. someone else in the room while completing the task). Although such
communication is harder to control in online experiments than in the physical
laboratory, this issue is not specific to interactive designs either.
The most severe problem for online interactive studies, and the largest
discrepancy with laboratory experiments, is attrition (participant dropout). In
laboratory sessions participants very rarely leave or turn out to be unable to
complete a session. In online experiments, attrition is a major issue—there is no
straightforward way to prevent participants from leaving a session by closing their
browser window or failing to submit responses to experimental decision situations
due to technical problems. Moreover, in contrast to the laboratory, interaction
partners are geographically scattered and the progress of an experiment depends on
their joint attention to it. Typically, groups proceed at the pace of the slowest
participant and long waiting times increase the risk of reduced attention, which may
‘cascade’ through the group. Thus, we took measures to retain attention and
promote successful completion.16 In our case, we used on-screen timers and told
participants that failure to reach a decision in due time would result in their removal
from the experiment without payment. Furthermore, in the event of a group member
dropping out we notified the remaining participants of that and they continued in
their reduced group.17 Data from incomplete groups is not included in the results
reported in Sect. 4. An alternative approach to dealing with dropouts is to terminate
the whole group once a member drops out. This may, however, damage the
reputation of the experimenter as participants will be unable to earn as much as they
had anticipated.
Our procedure of letting smaller groups continue ensures that real people
generate all the information that participants respond to. Alternative solutions to
non-responding participants, such as introducing random decisions or repeating
previous decisions (e.g. Suri and Watts 2011; Wang et al. 2012), may affect the
behavior of those who are still in the experiment (now responding to partially
computer-generated information) which potentially compromises the internal
validity of the data from groups affected by a dropout. It also raises issues of
deception if such computer-generated information is not disclosed. Moreover, this
16 On waiting pages (to which LIONESS directed participants once they made their decisions and waited
for their fellow group members to do so as well), we added an animation (a commonly used circular icon
spinning around) to assure the participants that the experiment was still active. Additional measures to
promote attention may include playing sounds (e.g. Hauser et al. 2016) or having the browser window
with the experimental pages placed in the foreground of the participants’ computer screen (‘focus
stealing’) when a decision is due. We did not use these more intrusive measures in this study.
17 The experimental instructions mentioned that the total number of points contributed to the public good
was multiplied by 1.6 before distributing the resulting amount equally among the group members. A
group member dropping out therefore increased the marginal per capita return of contributions.
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procedure may also compromise the validity of data from groups unaffected by
attrition, as participants cannot know whether their interaction partners’ behavior
shown to them is real or generated by a computer.
Due to the nature of conducting research via the Internet, some level of attrition
seems unavoidable. Attrition rates are likely to vary with factors such as group size,
complexity of the decision situation, and the pace of the experiment.18 Despite our
measures to prevent attrition, 84 participants (18%) who started the interaction
phase dropped out at some point in our experiment.19 As these participants were
distributed across experimental groups, the fraction of the data set affected by these
dropouts was considerably larger.
Figure 1 tracks the distribution of group sizes over time. All groups are initially
formed of four group members, but a group’s size may decrease over the course of
the experiment as participants drop out. The figure shows that our experiment
suffered from quite substantial attrition and only 53% of the groups finished with all
four members. Loss of group members was particularly likely around the ‘waiting
room’ stages preceding periods 1 and 11. Specifically, in period 1 dropouts are
presumably increased due to participants losing attention while waiting for their
group to form. Similarly, before period 11 started participants had to wait until each
of their group members had completed the comprehension questions, which could
take a considerable amount of time. In some cases, this led to the termination of the
whole group.
0%
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20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
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90%
100%
Period
Group of 4 Group of 3 Group of 2 Group of 1 No one finishing
Fig. 1 Attrition throughout the course of the experiment. Colors depict the group size. We always started
with groups of four but let participants continue if a member dropped out. (Color figure online)
18 Note that both the stability of the experimental software and the stability of the server on which the
software is run might strongly affect attrition too. Pilot sessions led us to deploy LIONESS on high-CPU
servers (available through Google Cloud) to facilitate many simultaneous server–client interactions.
19 Participants that did not respond in time or dropped out for any other reason did not receive any
payment.
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3.2.4 Payment and costs of experiments
After a session is over, participants are typically paid according to their
performance. MTurk, like other crowdsourcing platforms (see footnote 1),
facilitates secure payments. The experimental software can generate a random
code for each participant which can be matched with their MTurk ID, allowing for
payments according to performance in the experiment. It is important to process
payments immediately to maintain a good reputation as an MTurk requester.
All in all, typical costs per useable data point in an experiment with participants
recruited via MTurk are likely to be lower than in a laboratory experiment.
Nevertheless, these costs may vary with attrition rates, which can be affected by the
specific features of the experiment such as its length and group size (as one dropout
may compromise the data of the whole group). In our case, laboratory participants
earned $20.02 on average. Therefore, with a group of four as the unit of observation,
a useable data point cost us $80.08. Corresponding costs online were $47.32.20
4 Results
4.1 Contribution behavior
Figure 2 shows the aggregate contribution dynamics for both the online and
laboratory samples. Only the data from groups with no dropouts are reported. In the
condition without punishment, overall contributions were higher in our online
sample than in the laboratory (12.52 vs 8.30, p = 0.003).21 This result is consistent
with recent literature reporting college students to be less cooperative than non-
students and other adults (Belot et al. 2010; Carpenter and Seki 2011; Ga¨chter et al.
2004; Stoop et al. 2012). The difference in contributions emerges right in the very
first period of the game, with online participants contributing substantially more to
the public good (15.00 vs 11.04, p = 0.001). Higher contributions by MTurkers can
be only partially explained by the higher average age in the MTurk sample (OLS
fitted to contribution decisions in the first period of the first condition: age
b = 0.132, p = 0.031; MTurk dummy: b = 0.182, p = 0.004).22
The introduction of punishment opportunities strongly increases average
contributions in both samples (average contributions in periods 10 vs 11: laboratory:
4.63 vs 12.94, p = 0.001; online: 7.85 vs 16.15, p = 0.001). Moreover, average
20 We incurred additional costs in our online sessions through: (1) 60 participants who did complete the
comprehension questions but were not allocated to a group and who received $1; (2) participants from
groups with dropouts (a total of $725.54); (3) Amazon MTurk fees ($489.02). The online costs per usable
data point is computed as: (payments to the participants in the 62 groups finishing without
dropouts ? additional costs from 1–3)/62. This amount does not include payments to subjects who
took part in pilots we ran to determine our procedures.
21 Unless otherwise stated, all statistical tests are two-sided Mann–Whitney tests with group averages
over all periods as independent observations.
22 See List (2004) for a detailed discussion of age effects on cooperation behavior. These results are also
consistent with Ga¨chter and Herrmann (2011) who found in a laboratory one-shot public goods game that
older participants contribute more to the public good than younger ones.
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cooperation levels over the course of the game are higher than in the absence of
punishment (average group contributions in periods 11–20 vs 1–10: laboratory:
16.26 vs 8.30, p = 0.001; online: 17.15 vs 12.52, p = 0.001). As in the condition
without punishment, overall contributions within groups were slightly yet
Table 2 Cooperation dynamics
Contributions to the public good
No punishment Punishment
Laboratory MTurk Pooled Laboratory MTurk Pooled
Period -0.900*** -1.074*** -1.037*** 1.139 0.514* 0.682**
(0.309) (0.187) (0.160) (0.710) (0.289) (0.282)
Final period -3.400 -2.292** -2.512*** -10.203** -4.184** -5.795***
(2.253) (0.958) (0.881) (4.881) (1.688) (1.797)
MTurk 5.421*** 4.193
(1.867) (4.904)
Constant 10.470*** 17.046*** 11.402*** 25.980*** 35.272*** 29.601***
(1.592) (0.624) (1.650) (3.898) (3.792) (4.232)
N 720 2480 3200 720 2480 3200
F 8.75 33.66 34.45 2.19 3.12 3.75
Tobit estimation with left-censoring for ‘No punishment’ and right-censoring for ‘Punishment’. ‘Period’
is period number; ‘Final period’ is a dummy for last period; ‘MTurk’ is a dummy for the MTurk sample.
Robust standard errors clustered on groups
* p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.01
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Fig. 2 Contributions over time. Numbers in parentheses are the mean contributions in each experimental
condition. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals (clustered at the group level)
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significantly higher in our online sample than in the laboratory (16.26 vs 17.15,
p = 0.008).23
The regression models in Table 2 confirm that MTurk participants initially
contribute more to the public good than their laboratory counterparts (Wald test on
‘Constant’: p\ 0.001; Table 2, columns 1 and 2). Over the course of the game
cooperation decays at comparable rates (Wald test on ‘Period’: p = 0.624; columns
1 and 2). In the punishment condition, the constant differs between the two samples
(Wald test on ‘Constant’: p = 0.084; Table 2, columns 4 and 5), but the effect of
period is equivalent (Wald test on ‘Period’: p = 0.407; Table 2, columns 4 and 5).24
Individual responses to the contributions of fellow group members were
significant and similar across the online and laboratory samples (Wald test on
‘Mean peer contribution in t-1’: p = 0.505; Table 3, columns 1 and 2), which
suggests that individual decision making online was not more ‘random’ than in the
laboratory.25
Table 3 Cooperation dynamics (no punishment)
Contribution to the public good (no punishment)
Laboratory MTurk Pooled
Period -0.401** -0.503*** -0.485***
(0.204) (0.094) (0.085)
Final period -2.826 -1.316 -1.600**
(1.941) (0.827) (0.757)
Mean peer contribution in t-1 0.953*** 1.043*** 1.027***
(0.125) (0.060) (0.054)
MTurk 0.759
(0.778)
Constant -0.830 -0.006 -0.696
(1.674) (1.237) (0.931)
N 648 2232 2880
F 29.05 163.74 177.16
Left-censored Tobit estimation. ‘Period’ is period number; ‘Mean peer contribution in t-10 is the average
contribution of the other members in the group in t-1; ‘MTurk’ is a dummy for the MTurk sample.
Robust standard errors clustered on groups
* p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.01
23 See Online Appendix B for a comparison of our samples with the cross-cultural ones from Herrmann
et al. (2008).
24 An additional regression model including an interaction between ‘MTurk’ and ‘period’ does not detect
a significant effect of this interaction in either condition (p[ 0.560). Our results are also robust to the
inclusion of demographic controls and the use of a different (multilevel mixed effects) model
specification (see Table 6 of the Appendix).
25 An additional model with an interaction between ‘MTurk’ and ‘mean contributions’ shows no
significance for this item (p = 0.294). As in Table 2, results are robust to different model specifications
(see Table 7 of the Appendix).
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4.2 Punishment behavior
Participants in the online sample punished less often than their laboratory
counterparts (overall punishment frequency: 0.072 vs 0.167, p = 0.001). Moreover,
Fig. 3 shows that in both samples the frequency of punishment tended to decrease
over the course of the game, albeit less markedly in our online sample. Accordingly,
mean efficiency in the experimental condition with punishment was higher on
MTurk than in the laboratory (averages 26.91 vs 22.64 points per individual per
period, p = 0.002). In cases where participants decided to punish, they did so
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Fig. 3 Frequencies of punishment over time. Frequencies are calculated by counting instances of
assigning non-zero deduction points out of the total number of punishment opportunities per participant,
per recipient, per period. Mean punishment frequencies in parenthesis. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals clustered on groups
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Fig. 4 Directionality and severity of punishment in our laboratory and online samples. Stacked bars
show frequency distributions of punishment decisions. Each bar shows the distribution for a given
difference between punishers and their target’s contribution to the public good
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equally severely in both samples. The average number of points assigned when
punishing did not differ significantly between MTurk and the laboratory (4.15 vs
3.88; p = 0.545).
Figure 4 reveals that, in both samples, punishment was predominantly pro-social
in nature: most instances of punishment represented cooperators (who contributed
relatively many points to the public good) punishing defectors (who contributed
relatively fewer points). In the laboratory and online, both frequency and severity of
punishment were higher with increasing differences in contributions between the
punisher and their target (Fig. 4, compare the bottom four stacked bars; see Table 8
of the Appendix for regression analyses). Interestingly, we observe some instances
of anti-social punishment in both samples (Fig. 4, top four stacked bars).
Table 4 Determinants of punishment
Decision to punish (0 = no; 1 = yes) Punishment severity
Laboratory MTurk Pooled Laboratory MTurk Pooled
Target’s contribution -0.181*** -0.216*** -0.203*** -0.505*** -0.717*** -0.641***
(0.034) (0.015) (0.016) (0.074) (0.051) (0.043)
Punisher’s
contribution
-0.014 0.003 -0.002 -0.067 -0.011 -0.032
(0.034) (0.026) (0.022) (0.106) (0.074) (0.063)
Mean contrib. others 0.040 0.065** 0.058*** 0.136 0.228*** 0.197***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.019) (0.094) (0.071) (0.058)
Rec. punishment in
t-1
0.090*** 0.097** 0.092*** 0.310*** 0.273** 0.284***
(0.022) (0.045) (0.026) (0.074) (0.128) (0.069)
Period -0.126** -0.102*** -0.111*** -0.311** -0.280** -0.289***
(0.056) (0.037) (0.031) (0.143) (0.110) (0.088)
Final period -0.633* 0.524* 0.150 -1.014 2.401*** 1.271
(0.336) (0.294) (0.266) (1.220) (0.888) (0.780)
MTurk -0.965*** -2.631***
(0.231) (0.803)
Constant 0.960* -0.440 0.671** 1.569 -1.873* 1.088
(0.496) (0.290) (0.310) (1.533) (1.105) (1.008)
N 2160 7440 9600 2160 7440 9600
Pseudo R2 0.285 0.321 0.322 0.142 0.203 0.189
Values in columns 1–3 reflect estimates from logistic models fitted to the decisions to punish (0: no
deduction points assigned; 1: at least one deduction point assigned). Values in columns 3–6 reflect effect
estimates from left-censored Tobit models fitted to the number of deduction points assigned. ‘Target’s
contribution’ is the contribution of the punished participant; ‘Punisher’s contribution’ is the contribution
of the participant punishing; ‘Average contribution others’ is the mean contribution of the other two
members of the group; ‘Received punishment in t-10 is the punishment amount received from others in
the previous period; ‘Period’ is the period number; ‘Final period’ is a dummy for the last period; ‘MTurk’
is a dummy for the MTurk sample. Robust standard errors clustered on group
* p\ 0.10; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.01
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Table 4 presents an econometric analysis of punishment behavior. It confirms the
observations from Figs. 3 and 4. The overall patterns of punishment are similar in
the laboratory and online. This analysis further reveals that online participants
tended to punish less frequently and less severely, even after controlling for relative
contributions and previously received punishment (Table 4, Wald test on constants;
columns 1 and 2: p = 0.014; columns 3 and 4: p = 0.064).26
In sum, our results show that basic patterns of cooperation and punishment
behavior in the laboratory are largely replicable online, and thus are robust to
changes in the experimental method. Participants in our online sample initially
contribute more but, in the absence of punishment opportunities, cooperation decays
at similar rates. In both samples, peer punishment is mainly pro-social in nature, and
its introduction increases and stabilizes cooperation.
5 Attrition: endogenous or exogenous?
Our observation that, across conditions, experimental results are quite robust
already suggests that endogenous attrition due to what has happened in the
experiment (and hence selection) is not a big issue in our data. Here, we investigate
this issue more rigorously.
Crucially, we find no evidence that attrition was selective in our experiment:
dropout rates did not vary with the experimental condition (absence or presence of
punishment). Table 5 details the results of a proportional hazards model (Jenkins
1995) fitted to instances where participants dropped out. The first model confirms
the visual impression from Fig. 1 that dropout rates are relatively high in the first
period of each experimental condition (columns 1–3). Most likely, this effect is due
to the fact that participants have to wait for their group to form (before the start of
the first condition), or for all members of their group to finish reading the
instructions and completing the comprehension questions (before the start of the
second condition). Over the course of each of the conditions, the attrition rates
slightly decrease (‘period’ has a negative estimate), suggesting that over time
participants become more loyal to the task.
Models 3–5 show that attrition is much more likely when a group member has
dropped out in the previous period. This seems indicative of ‘cascading inattention’:
when a participant drops out of the session (e.g. due to inactivity, a closed
connection, or waning attention), their group members will have to wait for some
time before they can proceed.27 Reduced attention may lead to additional attrition.
The results in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 indicate that attrition did not depend on
cooperation and punishment behavior in each of the experimental conditions.
Specifically, dropouts did not depend on the behavior of the dropped-out
26 In Table 8 of the Appendix we present a more detailed analysis of pro-social and anti-social
punishment, indicating that by-and-large, punishment is driven by the same factors in the laboratory and
online. These models also reveal that both in the laboratory and online the positive effects of ‘received
punishment in t-10 on punishment reported in Table 4 are due to instances of anti-social punishment.
27 In our software a subject was considered to have dropped out after 20 s of inactivity. This delay was
introduced in order to allow people with brief connection irregularities to still complete the experiment.
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participants relative to their fellow group mates, or on their earnings. The model in
column 4 (fitted to the data from the experiment without punishment) shows that
dropouts did not depend on relative average contributions. In addition to that, the
model in column 5 (fitted to the data from the experiment with punishment) reveals
that individuals who dropped out had neither received more punishment relative to
Table 5 Determinants of attrition
Participant’s drop out in period t (0 = no; 1 = yes)
Pooled data Without
punishment
With
punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Punishment available 0.056 0.362 0.107
(0.598) (0.612) (0.611)
Period -0.093* -0.118** -0.094* -0.193*** -0.184**
(0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.066) (0.077)
First period 2.484*** 2.375*** 2.554***
(0.377) (0.376) (0.382)
Earnings -0.002 0.011
(0.143) (0.143)
Group member(s) dropped out in
previous period
1.896*** 1.677*** 2.024***
(0.382) (0.500) (0.574)
Relative average contribution 0.002 -0.082
(0.025) (0.053)
Relative average punishment
received
-0.105
(0.086)
Relative average punishment
given
-0.100
(0.086)
Constant -4.064*** -3.979*** -4.220*** -3.619*** -2.321*
(0.317) (0.318) (0.328) (0.353) (1.191)
N 8334 8332 8332 3998 3907
AIC 893.56 875.23 860.27 454.61 303.68
Values reflect estimates from proportional hazards models fitted to binary events of participants staying
(0) or dropping out (1) in a given round of the session, conditional on not having dropped out yet.
‘Punishment available’ is a dummy for the presence or absence of punishment; ‘Period’ is the period
number; ‘First period’ is a dummy for the first period; ‘Earnings’ reflect participants’ total earnings
relative to all other participants in the experiment in a given period; ‘Group member(s) dropped out in
previous period’ is a dummy taking the value of 0 (1) when none (at least one) of the group members had
left the session in the previous round (potentially delaying the progress within the session); ‘Relative
average contribution’ is the participant’s average contribution to the public good minus the average
contribution of their fellow group members in all rounds of the session so far; ‘Relative average received
(given) punishment’ are the average punishment received (given) by a participant minus the average
punishment received (given) by their fellow group members in all rounds so far
* p\ 0.10; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.01
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their group members who did not drop out, nor differed from them in terms of the
punishment towards others.
6 Discussion
In light of the results presented here, one might feel tempted to embrace interactive
online experimentation as a valuable complement to laboratory studies—and others
might even see it as a cost-efficient substitute. The measures presented here address
the most important methodological issues for conducting interactive experiments
online, and our case study illustrates that established results from the laboratory can
be replicated online. However, future research needs to establish how generalizable
our results are to other research questions as, despite these measures, methodolog-
ical differences between laboratory and online experimentation inevitably remain.
For instance, depending on the nature of the experiment, online participants can
conceivably communicate with each other to share their knowledge, strategies and
even experimental materials more quickly than their laboratory counterparts. As
mentioned earlier, most of the forums that monitor the online community have
mechanisms in place that prohibit the dissemination of materials, and participants
themselves might find this practice prohibitively costly. Yet, one cannot completely
rule out this possibility as laboratory and online participants can simply discuss an
experiment through other channels. To some extent, the nature of interactive designs
prevents participants from crafting intricate strategies beforehand, but this might not
be the case for experimental designs where participants can figure out ‘‘correct’’
answers, and they might be at risk of being ineffective (Haigh 2016), or exhibiting
reduced effect sizes (Chandler et al. 2015).
Comparisons between online and laboratory experiments can also be affected by
differences in selection bias. Participants in online and laboratory experiments may
self-select based on their opportunity cost of working time and their reservation
wage. Indeed, opportunity costs and reservation wages might well differ between
sessions conducted in the laboratory and online: laboratory participants might
decide on whether to participate in an experiment by looking at the show-up fee
paid and the travel costs they would incur (e.g. walk a long distance, experience bad
weather, or even get dressed!), whereas for online participants such costs would
typically be negligible. Interestingly though, results from Anderson et al. (2013)
show that a comparable type of selection is unlikely to bias inference about the
prevalence of other-regarding preferences. Thus, we have reasons to believe that our
design is not particularly affected by the relatively low opportunity costs, but that
others might be.
In this study, we systematically controlled for what we think are the most
daunting logistical issues for running an interactive experiment online. However,
one could argue that some important methodological differences between laboratory
and online experiments remain, and that such discrepancies may potentially affect
findings and treatment comparisons, regardless of experimental designs being
interactive or not. For instance, we replicate classic patterns of behavior in an
environment with less control but also find an important disparity between initial
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contributions. As we pointed out earlier though, this divergence is consistent with
the one found in related studies comparing different adult populations with college
students using various recruitment methods (Belot et al. 2010; Carpenter and Seki
2011; Ga¨chter et al. 2004; Stoop et al. 2012; Ga¨chter and Herrmann 2011). Yet we
acknowledge that unobserved methodological differences might account for some
of the variability observed in our results. Assessing the extent and severity of such
differences in other designs is certainly a topic for future research.
The similarities between our online and laboratory results suggest that interactive
designs conducted over the internet can be robust to changes in the experimental
method. Yet, our results are based on a comparison between sessions that differed in
terms of both the experimental method (online versus in the physical laboratory) and
the subject pool (MTurk workers versus university participants). Further assessment
of online experimentation could include a systematic study of the isolated effects of
the method for collecting data (online or laboratory) on the one hand, and the
subject pool (‘workers’ from an online labor market or university students) on the
other hand, e.g. by running online experiments with university students and inviting
MTurkers into the physical laboratory.
To summarize our discussion, we see our paper as a guide for researchers to think
about relevant issues before deciding whether the online or the physical laboratory
is most appropriate for their research question. Some might conclude that the loss of
control is too big a problem for their designs, whereas others are willing to bear that
loss of control. In the end, the extent of any loss of control is an empirical question
and we encourage researchers to add to our first piece of experimental evidence.
7 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we presented a detailed conceptual and methodological discussion of
conducting interactive experiments in the physical laboratory and online. We
illustrated similarities and differences using a repeated public goods experiment
without and with punishment. Our comparative results suggest that online data
quality is adequate and reliable, making online interactive experimentation a
potentially valuable complement to laboratory studies.
Most importantly, attrition, though a significant nuisance in online experiments,
did not compromise the internal validity of our data because attrition was unrelated
to what happened in our experiment. Future research will need to establish how
generalizable this result is to other interactive decision problems, in particular when
attrition might be treatment-specific, which poses the biggest problem to internal
validity (Zhou and Fishbach 2016). Future research should also investigate how
individual characteristics of participants (e.g. social preferences) and aspects of the
experimental design (e.g. group size, number of periods, complexity of the task and
its instructions) affect dropouts.
We observed that cooperation levels in our online sample are substantially higher
than in the laboratory, and are on the high end of the range of cooperation levels
observed in the cross-cultural samples of Herrmann et al. (2008). These differences
can be partly (but not completely) explained by the age of MTurkers relative to
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students in typical laboratory samples. Still, it is unclear whether some other
differences in terms of the participants’ demographics, the perceived degree of
anonymity, or the degree of familiarity with the experimental paradigm influence
our results. We believe that future research should explore such avenues.
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Appendix—additional statistical analyses
See Tables 6, 7 and 8.
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Table 7 Cooperation dynamics (no punishment)
Contribution to the public good (no punishment)
Tobit estimation Multilevel mixed effects estimation
Period -0.485*** -0.492*** -0.500*** -0.499***
(0.085) (0.090) (0.052) (0.054)
Final period -1.600** -1.741** -0.812** -0.864**
(0.757) (0.781) (0.394) (0.407)
Mean peer contribution in t-1 1.027*** 1.000*** 0.461*** 0.460***
(0.054) (0.058) (0.027) (0.027)
MTurk 0.759 1.827 2.252*** 2.980***
(0.778) (1.142) (0.862) (0.985)
Age 0.033 0.036
(0.039) (0.031)
Female 2.022*** 1.230**
(0.674) (0.557)
Single child 0.128 0.128
(1.017) (0.789)
Foreign -0.321 0.191
(1.903) (1.315)
Membership 2.153** 1.692**
(0.975) (0.690)
Constant -0.696 -3.582** 7.073*** 4.412***
(0.931) (1.599) (0.870) (1.296)
N 2880 2745 2880 2745
Chi2/F 177.16 80.17 822.66 799.84
Left-censored Tobit and multilevel mixed effects estimation, which allows for individual and group
differences, as well as for treatment-specific residuals. ‘Period’ is period number; ‘Final period’ is a
dummy for the last period; ‘Mean peer contribution in t-10 is the average contribution of the other
members in the group in t-1; ‘MTurk’ is a dummy for the MTurk sample; demographic controls are the
same of Table 6. Robust standard errors clustered on groups; Robust standard errors clustered on groups
for the Tobit model
* p\ 0.1; ** p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.01
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Online Appendix A – Experimental Instructions 
 
Below is the description of the HIT of our MTurk experiment, as seen by participants. 
 
 
Moreover, below are the instructions given to all of our participants (laboratory and MTurk). 
Each box corresponds to the screens shown. 
2 
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Online Appendix B – Cooperation and punishment on MTurk from a wider 
perspective 
 
Although aggregate dynamics of cooperation were similar across our samples, cooperation levels 
were appreciably higher online than in the laboratory, especially in the absence of punishment 
(Figure 2 of the main text). Indeed, in comparison to the wide spectrum of cooperation levels 
observed in a large cross-cultural sample (Herrmann et al. 2008), our online sample ranks at the 
very top (Figures B1 and B2). Specifically, in the absence of punishment our online sample tops 
the ranks (Fig. B1). In the presence of punishment it starts with the highest cooperation levels 
and ranks third in average cooperation (Fig. B2), while punishment is used less frequently than 
in any other sample (Fig. B3). 
 
Fig. B1   Contributions in the first period and average contribution in the No-Punishment condition in our samples  
from MTurk, the laboratory, and the 16 cities included in Herrmann et al. (2008) 
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Fig. B2   Contributions in the first period and average contribution in the Punishment condition in our samples  
from MTurk, the laboratory, and the 16 cities included in Herrmann et al. (2008) 
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Fig. B3   Punishment frequencies in the first period and overall frequencies in our samples  
from MTurk, the laboratory, and the 16 cities included in Herrmann et al. (2008) 
